Christ Junior College Model United Nations

The Nuclear Suppliers Group
Research Guide

Secretary – Generals Address:

Honourable Delegates,

I welcome you to the Nuclear Suppliers Group. First, and most importantly, I understand that the mandate of this committee does not fall under the purview of the United Nations Organization; however, it is my request that this committee submit a report on The Islamic Republic of Iran’s Nuclear Ambitions to the United Nations Security Council, for the benefit of both The Islamic Republic of Iran itself, and the World at large.

I would personally advise the delegates to treat the research guide given below as a starting point of research only, and not as a comprehensive document whatsoever.

Delegates, I wish you my best wishes, as I hope this committee reaches consensus on its decisions, and I do hope you will oblige my request.

Regards,
Nikunj Agarwal
Secretary – General

Chairperson’s Address

Honourable Delegates,

The Executive Board and I, welcome you to the Nuclear Suppliers Group at the Christ Junior College Model United Nations 2012, and hope that each delegate will come well equipped to committee.

Delegates must keep in mind, that the Nuclear Suppliers Group follows a separate set of guidelines. Hence, I request you to familiarize yourself with the same.

In order to help delegates with research, the Executive Board has prepared the following research guide. Please make sure you read through its entirety. However, I advise you to treat this guide only as a starting point of research, and to try and move beyond the research guide in committee discussions.

You may contact the Executive Board in case of any queries.

Regards,
Kopal Mukim
Chairperson
HISTORY OF THE NUCLEAR SUPPLIERS GROUP

On the 18th of May, 1974, the Republic Of India conducted its first ever nuclear test formally designated as Pokhran-1. This test proved that Nation States that transferred nuclear technology under the pretext of 'peaceful purposes' could indeed develop nuclear weapons. Nations that were signatories of the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) saw the need to further limit the export of nuclear equipment, materials or technology. A perceived advantage was that non-NPT nations, more specifically, France, as it was one of the most significant countries with regard to the topic at the time, would be involved. As nuclear sharing was a contentious issue that required a common consensus, a series of meetings took place in London from 1975 to 1979. This resulted in an agreement between countries on the guidelines for nuclear export. The Zangger Committee, the NSG's predecessor, also aimed to implement the same function. However, the NSG remained inactive between 1978 and 1991. During this period, the NSG's guidelines were in published as IAEA Document INFCIRC/254 (subsequently amended). The Zangger Committee continued to meet on a regular basis in order to review and amend the list of items subject to export controls.

After the test conducted by India, there was a need to amend the process of nuclear export. This demanded that nations remained unified to achieve this goal, as it required large scale cooperation. As an immediate measure, the Nuclear Suppliers Group was created. A list which contained a number of export materials that were essentially nuclear raw materials, called the 'triggers-list' was made. The triggers-list was incorporated taking into account the work done by the Zangger Committee. The guidelines of the NSG require states that import nuclear raw materials to provide assurances to member states, in addition to guaranteed checks by IAEA agents. Members of the NSG have pledged to act in accordance with the principles of this committee. The triggers-list remained unchanged until the year 1990. Indeed, concern about nuclear weapons proliferation remained acute, particularly in the light of technological developments which facilitated the development of a nuclear-weapon capability by additional States. Therefore the strict observance of the nuclear non-proliferation process was of fundamental importance. Wide participation in the international non-proliferation regime was equally vital. This would also be strengthened if States that were Parties to the NPT that had not already done so, concluded the requisite safeguard agreements with the IAEA.

At the 1990 NPT review conference, there were a number of recommendations made that had a significant impact on the NSG's activities in the 1990. With the issuance of that corrigendum, the summary records of the

Above-mentioned meetings were to be considered as final, especially with regard to the implementation of Article III of the IAEA document which was responsible for the inception of the NSG. The significant recommendations were- Firstly, NPT Parties consider further improvements in measures to prevent the diversion of nuclear technology for nuclear weapons. Secondly, States engage in consultations to ensure appropriate coordination of their controls on the exports of items, such as tritium, not identified in Article III.2 but still relevant to nuclear weapons proliferation and therefore to the NPT as a whole. Shortly thereafter, it became apparent that export control provisions then in force had not prevented Iraq, a party to the NPT, from pursuing a clandestine nuclear weapons programme. A large part of Iraq's effort had been to acquire dual-use items not covered by the NSG Guidelines and then to build its own triggers-list items. This gave major impetus to the NSG's development of its Dual-Use Guidelines. In doing so, the NSG demonstrated its commitment to nuclear non-proliferation by ensuring that items like those used by Iraq would from then on, be controlled to ensure their non-explosive use. These items would, however, continue to be available for peaceful nuclear activities subject to IAEA safeguards, as well as for other industrial activities where they would not contribute to nuclear proliferation.

Following these developments, the NSG decided in 1992 to establish additional guidelines for transfers of nuclear-related dual-use equipment, material and technology (items which have both nuclear and non-nuclear applications) that could make a significant contribution to an unsafe-guarded nuclear fuel cycle or nuclear explosive activity. The NSG also decided to establish a framework for consultation on the Dual-Use Guidelines, for the exchange of information on their implementation and on procurement activities
of potential proliferation concern. The NSG agreed to make full-scope safeguards agreements with the IAEA, as a condition for the future supply of Trigger List items to any non-nuclear-weapon State. These decisions ensured that only NPT parties and other States with full-scope safeguards agreements with the IAEA could benefit from nuclear transfers.

The conviction of the international community at this nuclear supply policy was reflected at the endorsement of these full-scope guidelines at the 1995 NPT Review and Extension Conference (NPTREC) already adopted by the NPT.

MODERN DAY RELEVANCE

Since its inception, the NSG has increased its number of members steadily. This committee aims to ensure that nuclear exports are carried out within permissible limits. With the continued suspicion of an Iranian nuclear arsenal that was initially initiated by external agents, nuclear trading becomes an issue of utmost importance in the present context. One of its other fundamental functions is to ensure that the distinction between a raw material that may yield a civilian program rather than a weapons program is drawn with clarity. Furthermore, treaties such as the NPT have made provisions and have laid emphasis on 'tolerable trade'. However, the supply of nuclear raw materials has continued to prevail in alarming quantities. Therefore, it is imperative that the NSG takes into account the suspicion directed towards nations such as the Islamic Republic Of Iran. As members of the international community, nations such as the United States Of America and the Russian Federation are under an obligation to contribute to a comprehensive resolution, in order to prevent a catastrophe of unprecedented proportions. In this light, the role and relevance of the NSG is evident.

Furthermore, the prospect of the outbreak of another global war would mean that there would be few committees that could be possible preventers of the same. This highlights further, the importance of this committee. Another point of significance is that nations such as the State of Israel have confirmed an immediate retaliation in the case of an attack by the Islamic Republic of Iran. At this juncture, the outbreak of war between the two nations seems inevitable. The NSG has laid strong emphasis on the inclusion of export licensing in the legal framework of nations, in addition to other enforcement measures. It would be advisable in the interest of international cooperation for the adoption of the guidelines of the NSG. The immediate aim of the NSG as stated previously, is to prevent the proliferation of nuclear weapons through the implementation of its guidelines without hindering international cooperation on peaceful uses of nuclear energy.

As the policy of “nuclear ambiguity” continues to be prevalent, it becomes difficult to deduce legitimately as to whether a program is strictly peaceful. In the global race for efficiency, it would be discriminatory and a complete violation of several principles to eradicate certain programs. Therefore the authenticity of commitments granted by governments may not be permitted to be placed in doubt. However, this committee may recommend a revision of permissible limits as it is a highly disputed factor. The entire international community has for long been convinced that a major nuclear war would be catastrophic for life on this planet. In the spirit of this conviction, the nuclear-weapon Powers have demonstrated, especially during the last decade, their increased determination to avoid a nuclear conflict. Now, negotiations to reduce nuclear arms have been supplemented by a reassessment of the military doctrines of the major armed alliances. As a consequence, the arms race and military confrontation between them are giving way to disarmament agreements and confidence-building measures. There have also been important steps toward a widely anticipated agreement on conventional forces in Europe and intensive work on the completion of a chemical weapons convention. While these positive developments in international relations must be sustained, there is a long road before a complete break through. Further substantive measures of nuclear disarmament, remain a priority for the international community and must be realized. In this wider process of nuclear arms limitation, the NSG has played and will continue to play a critical role.

NSG members meet periodically to review its guidelines and add new items that pose
proliferation risks or to eliminate goods that do not require special trade controls. Decisions in the NSG are taken only after a comprehensive consensus is achieved. Therefore this committee is based on the principle of consultation and seeks to meet the demand of the modern era.

HISTORY OF NUCLEAR WARFARE

Albert Einstein once said, “The potential dimensions and consequences of this deadly creation is beyond the perception of any living being”, regarding the atomic bomb. Six decades later, this statement seems to hold firm. The first known nuclear weapons development project was the "Manhattan Project" initiated in the year, 1942. It was a coalition project between the United Kingdom, the United States of America and Canada with suspected funding from France. The development was initiated in retaliation to "Operation AI" also known as the attack on Pearl Harbor, a US naval base in Hawaii, which was a violation of a peace treaty signed between Japan and the USA.

For the creation of the "Great Bomb", a number of eminent scientists such as the likes of Richard Feynman and Albert Einstein were recruited. Following a firebombing that destroyed many Japanese cities, the Allies prepared for a costly invasion of Japan. After a series of incidents that followed, which is of historical significance but is not of great relevance to the NSG, the Japanese city of Hiroshima was the primary target, with Kokura and Nagasaki as alternative targets.

About an hour before the bombing on the 6th of August 1945, Japanese early warning radar detected the approach of some American aircraft headed for the southern part of Japan. An alert was given and radio broadcasting stopped in many cities, among them Hiroshima. Approximately at 8:15 on the morning of the 6th of August, the bomb codenamed, the "Little Boy" was dropped on Hiroshima. The actual yield estimated after an analysis of blast damage was about 13 kilotons. It was less powerful than "Fat Man", which was dropped on Nagasaki (21–23 kt). However, the damage and the number of victims at Hiroshima was much higher, as Hiroshima was on a flat terrain.

The city of Nagasaki had been one of the largest sea ports in southern Japan and was of great wartime importance because of its wide-ranging industrial activity, including the production of ordnance, ships, military equipment, and other war materials. Nagasaki had never been subjected to large-scale bombing prior to the explosion of a nuclear weapon there. On the 9th of August 1945, at approximately 9 AM, the Fat Man was launched into the heart of Nagasaki.

An estimated 150,000 died in Hiroshima and an approximate 75,000 died in Nagasaki.

It is important to note that the cost of production and development are astonishing. Furthermore, the effect on the economy of nations is even more alarming. The NSG strives to ensure that 'checks' are placed at the production level so as to prevent further development. The bombings of Hiroshima and Nagasaki were a flagrant breach of human rights.

The Soviet Union was not invited to share in the new weapons developed by the United States and the other Allies. During the war, information had been pouring in from a number of volunteer spies involved with the Manhattan Project (known in Soviet cables under the codename of “Enormoz”), and the Soviet nuclear physicist Igor Kurchatov was carefully watching the Allied weapons development. In the years immediately after World War II, the issue of who should control atomic weapons became a major international point of contention. A half-hearted plan for international control was proposed at the newly formed United Nations, but it was clear both to American commentators, and to the Soviets, that it was an attempt primarily to stymie Russian nuclear efforts. The Soviets vetoed the plan, effectively ending any immediate postwar negotiations on atomic energy, and made overtures towards banning the use of atomic weapons in general.

Two days after the bombing of Nagasaki, the U.S. government released an official technical history of the Manhattan Project, known colloquially as the Smyth Report. The sanitized summary of the wartime effort focused primarily on the production facilities and scale of investment, written in part to justify the wartime expenditure to the American public. The Soviet program, ironically, would use the US Report as a blueprint,
seeking to duplicate as much as possible the American effort. The "secret cities" used literally vanished from the maps for decades to come.

After the Second World War, the fear of the use of the atomic bomb became evident. However, the obsession and development of nuclear weapons by the Soviet Union and the United States and its allies post World War II, almost led to another World War in certain instances (like the Cuban Crisis). But the Japanese experience and the balance of nuclear power on both sides became a deterrent to the actual usage of nuclear weapons.

"The atomic bomb was more than a weapon of terrible destruction; it was a psychological weapon".  
-Harry Truman, President of the USA.

The Executive Board of the NSG encourages delegates to use historical instances in order to strengthen debate.

**NON-PROLIFERATION TREATY**

The treaty on the non-proliferation of nuclear weapons was signed on the 1st of July 1968. The impetus behind the NPT was concern for the safety of a world with many nuclear weapon states. The NPT process was launched by Frank Aiken, Irish Minister for External Affairs, in 1958. It was opened for signature in 1968, with Finland the first State to sign. Accession became nearly universal after the end of the Cold War and of the South African apartheid. The NPT aims to avert the danger of nuclear war through the prevention of wider dissemination of nuclear weapons and other measures. It is the most reviewed and widely recognized treaty as it was an attempt at an evolutionary unifying factor. The issue of the prevention of the wider dissemination of nuclear weapons was discussed at the fourteenth session of the General Assembly (GA) in 1959.

From that year on, the GA adopted several resolutions calling on the Eighteen Nation Disarmament Committee (ENDC) established by the USSR and the USA to give priority to the negotiation of an international instrument to prevent the further proliferation of nuclear weapons. Subsequently, a joint draft between the two countries was submitted to the ENDC which reviewed it and in turn, submitted it to the GA. On 12th June, 1968, the GA adopted resolution 2373, commending the proposed treaty and requested for it to be opened and ratified at the earliest.

Twenty-five years after its enforcement, at the 1995 Review and Extension Conference, states party to the NPT, unanimously agreed for its indefinite continuation.

The NPT contains out 11 articles that apply to both nuclear-weapon State parties and non-parties regarding their obligation to prevent the spread of nuclear weapons via trade, smuggling, etc and to promote cooperation in the peaceful uses of nuclear energy to further the goal of achieving partial or complete disarmament.

Delegates are requested to conduct a comprehensive research into the NPT and this guide must only be treated as the starting point of research. Furthermore, special attention must be given to clauses regarding 'nuclear sharing or trade' as this bears tremendous significance to the NSG.

**A BRIEF ACCOUNT OF THE NUCLEAR HISTORY AND PRESENT SCENARIO OF THE ISLAMIC REPUBLIC OF IRAN**

Following the Iranian Revolution in 1979, Sayyed Ruhollah Musavi Kohemini became the supreme leader in December, 1979. Iran voted by national referendum to become an Islamic Republic and to approve a new democratic-theocratic hybrid constitution. Iran’s nuclear program is one of the most polarizing issues in one of the world’s most volatile regions. While American and European officials believe Iran is planning to build nuclear weapons, Iran’s leadership says that its goal in developing a nuclear program is to generate electricity without dipping into the oil supply it prefers to sell abroad, and to provide fuel for medical reactors.
Iran and the West have been at odds over its nuclear program for years. But the dispute has picked up steam since November 2011, with new findings by international inspectors, tougher sanctions by the United States and Europe against Iran’s oil exports, threats by Iran to shut the Strait of Hormuz and threats from Israel signaling increasing readiness to attack Iran’s nuclear facilities.

Iran's interest in nuclear technology dates back to the 1950's, when the Shah of Iran began receiving assistance through the U.S. Atoms for Peace program. Although Iran signed the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT) as a non-nuclear weapon state in 1968 and ratified it in 1970, the Shah may have had nuclear weapons ambitions. However, the 1979 Iranian Revolution and subsequent Iran-Iraq war limited the nuclear program's expansion. In the 1990's Iran began pursuing an indigenous nuclear fuel cycle capability by developing a uranium mining infrastructure and experimenting with uranium conversion and enrichment.

In 2002 and 2003, the National Council of Resistance of Iran, an opposition group based in Paris, revealed the existence of undeclared nuclear facilities at certain Iranian towns. Iran then admitted to small-scale enrichment experiments and plans to construct an enrichment facility, a heavy water production plant, a heavy water-moderated research reactor, and a fuel fabrication facility. Iran suspended its enrichment and conversion activities in 2003, but resumed uranium conversion in 2005, and started enrichment in 2006, increasing the enrichment level to almost 20% in 2010. The International Atomic Agency (IAEA) Board of Governors found Iran in non-compliance with its Comprehensive Safeguards Agreement, and the United Nations Security Council (UNSC) has passed seven resolutions demanding that Iran halt its enrichment and reprocessing activities. Tehran insists that possession of nuclear fuel cycle capabilities is its inalienable right and continues to enrich uranium, according to numerous sources.

In early November 2004, the UN received thousands of pages of information from a "walk-in" source indicating that Iran was modifying the nose cone of its Shahab-3 missile to carry a nuclear warhead. Iranian officials continue to dismiss these documents as forgeries. Furthermore, in early 2004, the IAEA discovered that Iran had hidden blueprints for a more advanced P-2 centrifuge and a document detailing uranium hemisphere casting from its inspectors. The IAEA called on Iran to be more cooperative and to answer all of the Agency’s questions about the origins of its centrifuge technology. Iran amended its previous declaration and admitted that it had clandestinely imported P-1 centrifuges through a foreign intermediary in 1987. Iran also acknowledged for the first time that it had imported P-2 centrifuge drawings in 1994.

Diplomatic progress truly broke down on the 1st of August, 2005, when Iran notified the IAEA that it would resume uranium conversion activities at Esfahan, a previously suspected nuclear site. On 5 August, Iran rejected the EU-3's Long Term Agreement, because Tehran felt that the proposal was heavy on demands, light on incentives, did not incorporate Iran's proposals, and violated the Paris Agreement. The Board of Governors responded by adopting a resolution that found Iran in non-compliance with its Safeguards Agreement (GOV/2005/64).

In February, Tehran ended its voluntary implementation of the Additional Protocol and resumed enrichment at Natanz, a suspected nuclear site. The IAEA Board of Governors subsequently voted to report Iran's case to the UN Security Council. On 15 March, the United Nations Security Council released a Presidential Statement, calling on Iran to cooperate with the IAEA. Iranian President, Mahmoud Ahmadinejad, responded by delivering a speech in April in which he discussed Iran's possession of a second uranium enrichment facility with P-2 centrifuges. In June of that year, the EU-3 together with the United States, China and Russia (P5+1) offered to provide Tehran with advanced civilian nuclear technology if Iran suspended enrichment activities and resumed implementation of the Additional Protocol. Iran responded to this proposal in a letter addressed to President Bush, blaming U.S. foreign policy for the chaos in the world. The letter made only brief reference to the nuclear issue and did not address the demands of the international community. In response to Iranian defiance, the UNSC unanimously passed Resolution 1696 in July, which demanded that Iran suspend enrichment activities, banned the international transfer of nuclear and missile technologies to Iran, and froze the foreign assets of twelve individuals and ten organizations involved with the Iranian nuclear program. President Ahmadinejad vowed to ignore the UNSC resolution and continue enrichment. That same month, Iran inaugurated a heavy water production plant at Arak, another site,
prompting yet another UNSC resolution. As it had with Resolution 1696, Iran also ignored Resolution 1737 and continued to operate its enrichment facility. Delegates are requested to use UNSC resolutions as an alternative source in order to gain a greater understanding of the topic.

On 21 September 2009, Iran revealed to the IAEA that it was building a second pilot enrichment facility. According to IAEA Spokesperson Marc Vidricaire, Iran's letter "stated that the enrichment level would be up to 5%," and the Agency was assured that additional information would be provided in due time. According to the U.S. government, the facility was located in an underground tunnel complex on the grounds of an Islamic Revolutionary Guards Corps Base near the city of Qom. Managed by Iran's Atomic Energy Organization, the enrichment facility was intended to hold 3,000 centrifuges and was not yet operational. The plant's size, secrecy, and location on an IRGC military base have led some analysts to argue that Iran constructed it in order to produce HEU for nuclear weapons. Tensions with the international community further increased in 2010 after President Ahmedinejad announced that Iran intended to construct 10 additional uranium enrichment facilities. Following President Ahmadinejad's announcement, France, Russia, and the United States sent a letter to the IAEA expressing their commitment to the fuel swap agreement and their resolve to ensure that the deal would be implemented in full. On 15 December 2009, the U.S. House of Representatives passed a bill stipulating the imposition of sanctions on "foreign companies that help supply gasoline to Iran."

In June 2010, the UN Security Council approved another set of sanctions under UNSCR 1929, primarily aimed at Iran's nuclear-related investments; three affiliates of the state-owned shipping company the Islamic Republic of Iran Shipping Lines (IRISL), which had already been targeted by unilateral U.S. and EU sanctions; and the Iranian Revolutionary Guard Corps.

On 13 July 2011, Russian foreign minister Sergey Lavrov proposed a phased approach to addressing the nuclear dispute with Iran. Under the Russian proposal, Iran's cooperation with the IAEA would be met with reciprocal steps from the P5+1.

On 8 November 2011, the IAEA released a highly anticipated safeguards report on Iran. In an annex to the report, the Agency presented a lengthy, detailed account of "possible military dimensions" to Iran's nuclear program. Most of the information in the annex had been known previously, but the November 2011 report was the first time that the IAEA assembled available evidence into one overview document. According to the report, Iran has engaged in a range of activities "relevant to the development of a nuclear explosive device." These included efforts to "procure nuclear related and dual-use equipment and materials by military-related individuals and entities," to develop "undeclared pathways for the production of nuclear material," to acquire "nuclear weapons development information and documentation," presumably from the A.Q. Khan network; and to "work on the development of an indigenous design of a nuclear weapon including the testing of components." The report further stated that prior to the end of 2003 those activities took place under a "structured program," and that there are indications that "some activities relevant to the development of a nuclear explosive device continued after 2003, and that some may still be ongoing." The IAEA report led to the adoption of a new resolution by the Board of Governors that expressed "deep and increasing concern" about the unresolved issues and urged Iran to fully comply with its obligations.

After the November 2011 IAEA report, and given that Russia and China both opposed a new UN Security Council resolution and new sanctions, the United States and the European Union launched a series of unprecedented measures unilaterally. On 23 January 2012, the European Union moved to freeze all assets of the Central Bank of Iran and agreed on a phase-out of Iranian oil imports by 1 July 2012. On 5 February, the United States ordered the freezing of all property of the Government of Iran, including its Central Bank.

In June 2012 the Obama administration granted waivers to a number of countries, exempting them from financial sanctions because they have significantly reduced their purchases of Iranian oil. These countries include: Turkey, South Korea, Sri Lanka, South Africa, Taiwan, India, and Malaysia.

The IAEA has been routinely confirming the non-diversion of declared nuclear material in Iran. However, the Agency has also continually requested clarification of a number of outstanding issues related to possible nuclear weaponization activities in Iran. The IAEA stated that the intelligence it has received over the past several years raised concerns about the possibility of current and previous experiments pertaining to the
construction of a nuclear warhead for a missile. Iran has maintained that the intelligence documents provided to the IAEA are forgeries and has refused to discuss the allegations with the IAEA.

Despite seven UN Security Council Resolutions (UNSC) condemning its actions and six rounds of sanctions, Iran continues to enrich uranium at the Natanz facility and has begun enrichment at the Fordow Fuel Enrichment Plant (FFEP). According to the IAEA Director General's report submitted to the Board on 25 May 2012, Iran has accumulated an estimated 6,197 kg of LEU enriched up to 5%. According to the IAEA, as of May 2012, Iran had also produced about 110.1 kg of UF6 enriched up to 20% U-235 at the Natanz plant. The IAEA has collected and analyzed environmental samples and reported that samples taken on 15 February 2012 showed the presence of particles with enrichment levels up to 27% U-235, higher than the maximum declared level of 20%. Iran asserted that such anomalies were unintended and occurred for technical reasons beyond the operator's control. The IAEA reported that it was examining this explanation. The Agency has also been requesting additional information regarding further enrichment.

It is imperative that the NSG takes into account every detail of the Islamic Republic of Iran's nuclear activity over the last two decades in order to frame a feasible resolution.

CONSEQUENCES OF IRAN'S NUCLEAR AMBITIONS

Several nations have been divided in their response to Iran's nuclear ambitions. While most agree that a nuclear development program in general would impede the NSG’s aim to achieve partial or complete disarmament of weapons of mass destruction. In this light, the nation of Iran must take note of the potential consequences that its program can yield. Firstly, the State of Israel has implied on numerous occasions, its readiness to retaliate in case of a confirmed Iranian nuclear weapons program and vice-versa. Secondly, states surrounding the region, view the above conflict as direct provocation. Thirdly, it can be deduced from this scenario, a direct involvement of the superpowers of the world. Thus, it is the NSG's duty to ensure that such a scenario does no arise and this council must direct its efforts to relieving the plight of nations in tension.

A few examples from the past would prove to be of relevance to the above scenario: During the Iran-Iraq war, Saudi Arabia was suspected of purchasing nuclear warheads from the Peoples Republic of China.

Over ten Middle Eastern and North African states have expressed their desire to develop nuclear warheads. The time has come for the World Body to act.

CLOSING REMARKS

The question of a "Nuclear Weapons Free Middle East", was put forth initially by the Islamic Republic Of Iran. However, in the modern day, this very nuclear program seems to be the biggest impediment to this scenario. Several inquiries have resulted in no outcomes. The Executive Board of the Nuclear Suppliers Group urges every member nation to meet their obligation and contribute to solving the crisis at hand. The problem must be addressed at its root. As stated earlier, this guide must be treated as the starting point of research.

QUESTIONS TO CONSIDER

- What is your nation's stance on Iran's nuclear ambitions?
- What are the existing provisions for nuclear non-proliferation apart from the NPT?
- To what extent has your nation implemented global efforts to ensure non-proliferation?
- To what extent would the legal framework for non-proliferation require modification?
To what extent has the Iran-Israeli conflict affected your nation or surrounding nations?
What is the role of major powers in solving the issue?
What would be a possible solution to the problem?
Does your nation possess an active nuclear program? If so, to what degree has development taken place?

USEFUL RESOURCES

- http://www.nuclearsuppliersgroup.org/Leng/02-guide.htm
- http://www.reuters.com/article/2012/10/06/us-iran-nuclear-idUSBRE89508X20121006
- http://www.reuters.com/article/2012/10/05/us-iran-sanctions-un-idUSBRE89412Z20121005

Regards,
Kopal Mukim
Chairperson

Karan Dev
Vice-Chairperson